Program to Eradicate Malaria in Sardinia, 1946–1950 by Tognotti, Eugenia
During 1946–1950, the Rockefeller Foundation conduct-
ed a large-scale experiment in Sardinia to test the feasibility 
of indigenous vector species eradication. The interruption 
of malaria transmission did not require vector eradication, 
but with a goal of developing a new strategy to fight malaria, 
the choice was made to wage a rapid attack with a powerful 
new chemical. Costing millions of dollars, 267 metric tons 
of DDT were spread over the island. Although malaria was 
eliminated, the main objective, complete eradication of the 
vector, was not achieved. Despite its being considered al-
most eradicated in the mid-1940s, malaria 60 years later is 
still a major public health problem throughout the world, and 
its eradication is back on the global health agenda.
I
n 1944, Sardinia was used as a test site for eradicating 
native malaria-carrying mosquitoes (1). During that year, 
the  insecticide  DDT  (dichloro-diphenyl-trichloroethane) 
was  sprayed  inside  houses  to  annihilate  mosquitoes  in 
Castel Volturno (2). During that spring, another trial was 
conducted in the Tiber Delta and Pontine marshes, where 
breeding sites of Anopheles labranchiae, the most common, 
abundant, and widely distributed vector in the Mediterra-
nean basin, had increased dramatically after German troops 
strategically flooded a large area to hinder the movement 
of the Allied Armed Forces (3). In the face of a potential 
malaria outbreak, the Allied Malaria Control Commission 
studied the effect of the DDT spray, in the absence of other 
control measures, on anopheline density.
The operations in central Italy were under the direction 
of Paul F. Russell and Fred Soper, officers of the Rock-
efeller Foundation. Russell was a veteran of malaria-con-
trol campaigns and a graduate of the Harvard School of 
Public Health Soper was a public health administrator and 
epidemiologist who during 1939 and 1941 (4) had directed 
successful eradication campaigns of an invading vector, A. 
gambiae, in Brazil and Egypt. Attempting to eradicate the 
indigenous well-adapted mosquito species A. labranchiae 
was more difficult than attempting to eradicate an invad-
ing vector. Both believed that the miraculous effectiveness 
of DDT (5) opened up a dazzling new era for the study 
of malaria: DDT was highly effective against the parasite-
carrying mosquitoes and interrupted the transmission of the 
malaria parasite. In addition DDT was inexpensive, consid-
ered safe, and easy to use.
In this climate of optimism, the Italian malariologist 
Alberto  Missiroli  convinced  civil  authorities  in  Italy  to 
conduct a massive malaria control program. The United 
Nations  Relief  and  Rehabilitation  Administration  (UN-
RRA) provided funds (6). The idea of large-scale eradica-
tion work in Sardinia took shape in a series of meetings 
involving Missiroli, the director of UNRRA for Italy, and 
Soper, who was a staunch advocate of the vector-eradica-
tion approach to malaria control.
In a July 1945 letter from Italy (7), Soper informed 
George H. Strode, scientific director of the International 
Health Division (IHD), that Missiroli was “very insistent 
that the first work” begin in Sardinia. He also reported on 
meetings with Colonel Reekie of the UNRRA. They had 
undertaken a rapid reconnaissance flight over Sardinia, and 
in conclusion Soper stated:
…from  available  information  and  what  little  I 
had seen it appeared that anopheles eradication in 
Sardinia might be entirely feasible if the materials, 
transportation,  money,  and  authority  could  be 
made available.
Last-minute decisions left little time for planning. In 
their haste, the Rockefeller Foundation staff underestimat-
ed the difficulties of the project. In addition, the rush to 
conclude the agreement with government representatives 
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in Italy and with the High Commissioner for Sardinia led 
to a lack of clarity about the goal of the campaign (8). The 
aims of the IHD were entirely scientific, as was clearly ex-
plained in a letter from Strode to the UNRRA director in 
1946: “The only reason that I was interested in the proposal 
was the fact that we were to attempt an eradication program 
among the indigenous species of anophelene” (9).
However, the public health authorities in Italy were in-
terested in implementing a full-scale public health program 
and were willing to invest heavily in this endeavor and use 
their recovery funds. They were unlikely to have devoted 
so much interest to support a purely scientific experiment.
This ambiguity dragged on for 2 years. Ultimately, the 
project became a public health campaign against malaria. 
A change in the goal enabled the Regional Agency for the 
Anti-Anopheles Struggle in Sardinia (ERLAAS) team to 
convince the increasingly reluctant High Commissioners 
for Hygiene and Health to divert funds from the scant health 
budget toward the campaign. The story of the “Sardinian 
Project” (see online Technical Appendix, note 1, available 
from  www.cdc.gov/EID/content/15/9/1460-Techapp.pdf), 
the greatest antimalaria effort in Europe since the discov-
ery of the cycle of transmission of the disease, needs to be 
reexamined in the light of the recent debate about the new 
global malaria eradication strategy (10). This article, based 
on firsthand sources such as letters, memoranda, and dia-
ries (8), concentrates on the objectives, errors, results, and 
final implications of the campaign.
Sardinia, a Malaria-Endemic Island
Malaria is believed to have been introduced to Sardinia 
by infected workers imported from North Africa after the 
Carthaginian conquest of Sardinia in 502 b c . The disease 
became endemic to this region during the medieval period 
(11), but since the classical ages, Sardinia had been tarred 
with the reputation as an “unhealthy island” (12) (online 
Technical Appendix, note 2). In the last decade of the nine-
teenth century, the average number of deaths caused by 
malaria on this island oscillated between 2,000 and 2,200 
per year (in 1901, the island had a population of 795,793) 
(13). Sardinia kept the unfortunate primacy of being the 
most malaria-ridden region in Italy (Table 1) because of the 
high prevalence of Plasmodium falciparum and its associ-
ated high mortality rates. Rates were particularly high for 
children <5 years of age in highly malaria-endemic areas.
Economic  and  demographic  development  (14)  was 
dramatically inhibited. Malaria infested the plains, which 
constituted the most fertile and least populated areas. The 
productivity  of  those  affected  with  chronic  disease  was 
low, and they were unable to work during fever attacks 
(15). A decline in the mortality rate began after advanced 
antimalarial legislation (1900–1907) provided free quinine, 
which attacks malaria parasites in the bloodstream. In the 
1920s and 1930s, the fascist regime carried out an indirect 
battle  for  eradication  through  its  great  land  reclamation 
project, which used modern technology on a large scale for 
drainage and sanitation (16). The centralized “Italian way” 
produced a decline in malaria mortality rates, but rates also 
declined as a result of greater access to medical services 
by the rural population, the main reservoir of malaria in 
the past. Over 40 years, mortality rates declined from an 
average of 2,000 during 1890–1900 to 138 in 1939 and 88 
in 1940. The decline in illness and death from malaria was 
interrupted only by the 2 world wars: in 1946, 74,600 ma-
laria cases and 169 deaths were reported (17).
At that time, malaria was still endemic to Sardinia. In 
1947, an ERLAAS survey showed an overall spleen index 
(a measure of splenomegaly) of ≈21%; in many low-lying 
places, the index approached 100% (18). The effect of ma-
laria on public health and economic growth was still severe; 
according to contemporary analyses, the vicious circle of 
poverty and disease could be broken only by eliminating 
malaria. Sardinia, therefore, appeared to be the ideal site. It 
was an island. In addition, the weakness of local power rep-
resented an additional advantage for a project that verged 
on being a military occupation of the territory.
However,  there  were  enormous  organizational  and 
logistical problems. One was the sheer size of the island: 
9,294 square miles, with mountainous massifs and ravines. 
Another was the fast-flowing streams that carried water into 
low-lying areas in the springtime, forming stagnant pools 
(19). The island was virtually devoid of internal commu-
nication systems, and the inhabitants lived almost exclu-
sively in villages. Few local people had technical expertise, 
and it was not easy to recruit and train people as disinfec-
tors, larva scouts, and sprayers or to find suitable staff to 
perform  supply,  transport,  and  administrative  services. 
However, these obstacles did not hinder the IHD decision 
to implement the program. They feared that the ongoing 
crisis in UNRRA and the unstable political balance in Italy 
might ultimately impede their efforts.
On October 2, 1945, the Rockefeller Foundation for-
mally agreed to collaborate in the project. A few weeks 
later, UNRRA allocated an initial sum of US $400,000 and 
approved the plan, in agreement with the Italian govern-
ment and the Rockefeller Foundation. In April 1946, the 
IHD founded the special agency ERLAAS to implement 
the program. The first director was John Austin Kerr, and 
the medical entomologist was Thomas Aitken. The island 
was  divided  into  divisions,  sections,  and  sectors  of  2.8 
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Table 1. Deaths from malaria, Italy and Sardinia  
No. deaths/100,000 inhabitants 
Years  Italy  Sardinia 
1887–1889 58 300
1900–1902 59 298
1912–1914 6 43HISTORICAL REVIEW
square miles, the basic geographic unit for antilarval spray-
ing. The entomologic service headquarters were set up in 
Cagliari,  and  the  chief  executive  officers  operated  from 
there. Workers on the ground were responsible for day-to-
day operations in their specific localities and were crucial 
to the entire operation. The organization followed military 
principles of hierarchy and discipline. Scouts for larvae and 
pupae were given rewards for good work and penalized for 
sloppy performance.
Difficulties of the Antimalaria Campaign
Problems emerged even before the Sardinian Project 
began. Aitken’s entomologic survey indicated that 3 prin-
cipal species of Anopheles mosquitoes were in Sardinia: A. 
labranchiae, A. algeriensis, and A. claviger. Unlike tropical 
malaria-carrying mosquitoes that thrive close to villages, A. 
labranchiae “breeded usually in open water, but is often 
found in marshes and mountain streams” (20). According 
to some estimates, the number of water sites was some-
where between 1,000,000 and 1,200,000. 
During their investigation, the entomologists faced the 
alarming fact that making a sharp distinction between the 
breeding places of A. labranchiae mosquitoes and those of 
other species was impossible. As a result, larva control was 
extremely difficult. The topography and the altitude of the 
various breeding sites meant that operations took longer 
and were more costly than forecast. Mules and donkeys   
(Figure 1) rather than jeeps had to be used to transport 
equipment. By mid-1946, it was already clear that eradica-
tion of the indigenous vector would be far more difficult 
than eradication of invaders such as A. gambiae mosqui-
toes in Brazil. Complaints in this regard made by superin-
tendent Kerr to IHD headquarters were not well received. 
As well, their eagerness to achieve their objective encour-
aged them to overlook alarming information about the po-
tential toxicity of DDT (online Technical Appendix, note 
3), of which Fred Soper was aware as he insinuated in a 
letter, suggesting that there were “contraindications to the 
use of DDT as a larvicide as planned.” At a meeting of 
agricultural entomologists in Riverside, California, USA, 
he had heard alarming news of rather high concentrations 
of DDT being found in animal milk. These were not “care-
fully studied observations,” but he advised, “Caution may 
be indicated” (21).
In the summer of 1946, Kerr began warning about the 
need to study potential reinfestation after the campaign, 
stating that “a period of at least one full year” was needed 
for extensive ecological field studies (22). About Kerr’s 
insistence,  Soper  wrote  ironically  to  Strode  that,  “It  is 
indeed to be regretted that the word ‘ecology’ was ever 
invented, or having been invented came to [Kerr’s] atten-
tion” (23). In October 1946, the second ERLAAS Advi-
sory Committee approved a new plan that included indoor 
residual spraying, trial larviciding, and all-out larviciding 
of the entire island.
Despite the optimism of IHD leaders, Kerr’s misgiv-
ings increased. According to an account by the parasitolo-
gist O.R. McCoy, who visited Sardinia for the IHD, sub-
stantial problems had arisen as a result of Kerr’s conviction 
that eradication was impossible. Kerr’s concerns, and the 
tremendous difficulties of the eradication program, threat-
ened to delay the operations by a whole year, at the risk of 
losing UNRRA funding. Hostility toward the organization 
increased. The aid to Eastern European countries was seen 
as a dangerous instrument that was facilitating the consoli-
dation of communist governments. McCoy wrote, “Since 
additional funds depend upon UNRRA’s recommendation 
it is essential that the budget for another year of work be 
approved.” And, “The stake is too great,” McCoy empha-
sized, “It was made very clear that the next few months 
during which UNRRA is still functioning are critical as far 
as ERLAAS is concerned.”
Budget problems were becoming increasingly challeng-
ing, partly because of fluctuations in the value of the lira. 
Field experience had shown that the campaign would have 
to take longer than expected. Again, the Italian government 
reluctantly provided additional funds that permitted the pro-
gram to continue. By June 1947, ≈85% of all villages and 
towns in Sardinia had been completely sprayed with DDT. 
The operations consisted of a single spraying of every room 
in every house, all outhouses, and isolated buildings in the 
countryside, including the ancient nuraghi (stone dwellings 
centered on a main tower or fortress) (24).
Effects of Early Cold War Tensions
Additional problems were created by the tensions of 
the Cold War (continuing state of conflict, tension, and 
competition after World War II) (25). On July 2, 1947, the 
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Figure 1. Donkeys used to transport equipment and larvicide in hilly 
territory, Sardinia, 1948–1950. Photograph by Wolfgang Suschitzky. 
Reprinted with permission from Istituto Etnografico della Sardegna.Program to Eradicate Malaria in Sardinia
Sardinian edition of l’Unità, a newspaper that served as 
the mouthpiece of the Communist Party, wrote that ER-
LAAS was creating a neo-fascist organization in Sardinia, 
with a hierarchical, almost military, structure that had 600 
vehicles and cells (organized groups) in the villages. This 
information appeared in the International Herald Tribune 
on July 21, 1947. In the following months, communists 
began promoting disruption of the execution of the Mar-
shall Plan by means of open confrontation with local gov-
ernments. This situation prompted the IHD to transform 
the original objective and proceed more swiftly. “The eyes 
of the world were upon the Anopheles eradication,” and 
it was of prime importance to move forward at all costs 
before a crisis ensued (26). However, Kerr’s conviction 
that  the  eradication  of  A.  labranchiae  mosquitoes  was 
not feasible (27) was problematic. Finally, in a dramatic 
letter to Strode, the superintendent commented “I do not 
have either the mental or physical stamina for this task, 
which I am convinced is certain to fail.” The frantic cor-
respondence  among  the  chief  executives  indicated  that 
they feared that the campaign was destined for failure, 
while they were intending to present positive results at 
the first meeting of the World Health Organization Ex-
pert Committee on Insecticides, which would take place 
in Cagliari in May 1948. In September 1947, the follow-
ing dramatic scenario played out, including a letter from 
Bauer to Strode:
It would be a tragedy if the project was abandoned 
now without a thorough trial. It would open us to 
all sort of criticism, especially in view of the fact 
that a large sum of money which did not belong to 
us in the first place has already been spent; Italian 
communists would jump on this occasion (28).
The ultimate decision was that Kerr should be replaced. 
Under the new superintendent, John Logan, the operations 
continued with the planned residual spraying against adult 
mosquitoes. A quarantine service was set up, and ships and 
planes arriving in Sardinia were inspected (29).
Political tensions grew as the elections of April 1948 ap-
proached. The US government intervened in Italy to prevent 
the Communists and the Socialists from winning election 
funding. The Truman administration declared that no further 
help from the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) 
would be given to the country if the Communist party won 
the elections (online Technical Appendix, note 4).
Communist press attacks on the Rockefeller Founda-
tion increased. Some newspapers wrote that the ERLAAS 
vehicles were secretly armed and equipped to “take over” 
Sardinia. A radio report from northern Italy claimed that 
ERLAAS was paving the way for the transformation of the 
island into an enormous US air base (30). Furthermore, an-
tagonism to the larviciding was growing, and legal actions 
for damages were pending.
Overall, ERLAAS operations were welcomed by the 
people of Sardinia. The inhabitants of the rural areas appre-
ciated the abatement of mosquitoes and houseflies. Exhor-
tations to the disinfectors appeared in verse on rocks and 
house walls. The few criticisms of the campaign concerned 
the “violence of the method.”
In 1948, a sociologist a report on communism in Sar-
dinia concluded that “the popular Front deputies at Rome 
could cause some outcry over the allocation of government 
controlled funds for equipment” (31). At this time, the staff 
of the Sardinian Project did not speak of “an eradication 
program among indigenous species of anophelines” but of 
“a large project which is one of the most important public 
health in the world today” (32). Various leaflets were used 
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Figure 2. Poster by the Regional Agency for the Anti-Anopheles 
Struggle in Sardinia. Photograph by Wolfgang Suschitzky. Reprinted 
with permission from Istituto Etnografico della Sardegna.HISTORICAL REVIEW
to demonstrate the beneficial effects of the campaign. One 
showed “before” and “after” images of Sardinia; “before” 
pictured a frowning sun and a giant mosquito, and “after” 
featured a smiling sun and an island free of mosquitoes, 
wiped out by a jet of DDT (Figure 2).
At  the  end  of  1948,  the  campaign  entered  its  final 
phase. In the summer of 1948, the last offensive against 
Anopheles larvae (Figure 3) was launched as sort of a “Nor-
mandy Landing” with an army of 30,000 men. Foci were 
cleaned with long-handled billhooks, vegetation was cut 
back, 100,000 acres of swampland were drained, and tons 
of insecticide were spread over the island by aircraft and 
helicopters (Figure 4). At the height of the campaign, the 
weekly amount of pure DDT spread was about 3,250 kg. 
Approximately 110 km2 of water had been treated with a 
dose of 30 mg/m2 (33). At the end of that year, the manage-
ment of ERLAAS announced that the number of breeding 
places of Labranchiae mosquitoes had been drastically re-
duced. The presumed reduction was 99.93%. The remain-
ing positive foci were mainly in isolated areas (34). In 1950, 
for the first time in the history of Sardinia, no new cases of 
the disease were reported on the island (Table 2).
 The first large-scale attempt to rid a malaria-endemic 
area of indigenous mosquitoes had not succeeded, but it 
did free Sardinia from malaria. Emphasizing this outcome 
enabled the hierarchy of the IHD to maintain the concept of 
eradication, which prevailed in 1955 in the Eighth World 
Health Assembly, and they voted to adopt DDT as a pri-
mary tool in the fight against malaria (35).
IHD leaders slowly created a story of success (36). 
Writing to Missiroli, Paul Russell exalted the fact that “the 
local health authorities could forever keep it under control, 
while the first large areas previously infested with the dis-
ease could be reclaimed and cultivated.” He also empha-
sized the scientific results:
If the ERLAAS proves that it is not feasible to 
attempt  complete  eradication  of  a  tenacious 
indigenous  species  like  A.  labranchiae  as  a 
measure of malaria control, such an answer will be 
of great value to the scientific world, because on 
all sides we hear the cry “eradicate the mosquito” 
(37).
Conclusions
During the campaign, under the pressure of various 
factors, the initial ambitious purpose had changed: Sardin-
ia, at the end, was free from the disease, not from the vec-
tors that remained. However, vector breeding places were 
drastically reduced by 99.93%.
The widespread use of DDT was not required, con-
sidering the potential negative effect on the environment 
and on persons. To interrupt malaria transmission, indoor 
DDT spraying, as already demonstrated in peninsular areas 
where the chemical was sprayed in small amounts on the 
house walls, would have been sufficient.
At the 60th anniversary of the end of the campaign, a 
risk-to-benefit assessment was possible. It is an established 
fact that the eradication of malaria contributed powerfully 
to the subsequent socioeconomic development and public 
health of the island.
With respect to the possible long-term effects of DDT, 
a team of Sardinian researchers recently conducted stud-
ies to determine whether DDT has negatively affected the 
health of the human population of the island. On the ba-
sis of statistics on births and stillbirths in the prewar and 
postwar years (1945–1954), widespread use of DDT appar-
ently did not affect stillbirth rates, infant mortality rates, or 
the male:female ratio of newborns (38). With regard to the 
potential carcinogenicity of DDT, the results of the most 
recent follow-up study of deaths among 4,552 male work-
ers exposed to DDT demonstrated little evidence of a link 
between occupational DDT exposure and death from any 
of the cancers previously associated with exposure to this 
chemical (e.g., pancreatic cancer) (39). The researchers of 
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  Figure 3. Larviciding. Photograph by Wolfgang Suschitzky. Reprinted 
with permission from Istituto Etnografico della Sardegna.Program to Eradicate Malaria in Sardinia
this study argued that expansion of the cohort and collec-
tion of information are needed to clarify these findings. No 
studies of the environmental effects have been conducted.
The  lessons  learned  from  the  Rockefeller  Founda-
tion antimalarial campaign in Sardinia have contemporary 
relevance  in  discussions  of  DDT-based  malaria  control 
strategies around the world. Nevertheless, although DDT 
played an important role in the liberation of the island from 
malaria, it was not sufficient alone to accomplish the task. 
The benefits of this enormous expenditure of funds were 
cast-iron  (inflexible)  organization,  exceptional  technical 
and scientific expertise, and continuity in mosquito control 
efforts maintained by the regional government for decades 
after conclusion of the campaign. Geographic isolation also 
played a role. Furthermore, the support of UNRRA and of 
the Italian High Commissioner for Health, as well as the 
ability and experience of the Rockefeller Foundation staff, 
neutralized the considerable obstacles of lack of techni-
cal resources, expertise, and infrastructure on the ground. 
An additional factor was the favorable attitude of the lo-
cal community, which had grown accustomed for decades 
to fighting malaria with quinine and with land reclamation 
projects that reduced the mosquito habitat.
In conclusion, the Rockefeller Foundation antimalarial 
campaign in Sardinia was an important step in the devel-
opment of malaria control policies in the 20th century. It 
displays the various approaches to the control of malaria 
and contributes important lessons for the ongoing debate 
over possible solutions to the terrible problem of malaria 
and the difficult challenge of eliminating it from the mod-
ern world (40). 
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